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GAINING ASSURANCES
JULIA Y. LEE*
This Article explores alternative legal mechanisms for solving a type
of coordination problem known as the Assurance Game. The traditional
approach has been to focus on changing the expectations of the parties. This
Article focuses on altering the underlying payoff structure—not through
sanctions, but through risk-reducing mechanisms such as guarantees.
One type of risk-reducing mechanism is the conditional money-back
guarantee. Conditional money-back guarantees operate in settings ranging
from federal deposit insurance to daily deal websites such as Groupon and
LivingSocial. In each of these, a promise is made to return an individual’s
monetary contribution if an event or condition that depends on the actions of
others is met. The condition may be (1) the reaching of a predetermined
threshold, or (2) the happening of some event. This Article examines both
types of conditional money-back guarantees and analyzes factors that may
impact their effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
Often, individuals act, or fail to act, based on predictions of how
others will act. They continually make strategic decisions based on
what they believe other people will do, whether it is to contribute to a
cause, sell a falling stock, or invest in a new technology. In some
situations, they will be better off if everyone else cooperates while they
defect. In others, there are no gains to be had from defecting: the best
result is if everyone cooperates. The former describes the well-known
Prisoner’s Dilemma; the latter, the Assurance Game or Stag Hunt. The
problem in both is one of information and trust (or lack thereof).
Legal scholars have applied game theory to study how legal rules
impact strategic behavior. The conventional paradigm assumes that
(1) problems of cooperation, as represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
are solved by changing incentives through sanctions; and (2) problems
of coordination, as represented by the Assurance Game, are solved by
changing expectations, not incentives.1 A substantial body of
scholarship has challenged the first assumption, demonstrating the
ineffectiveness and counterproductivity of sanctions in correcting the
problem of defection or free-riding in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.2 These
scholars have argued that changing expectations—building trust and

1.
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions
of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 618 (2010) (“The solution to
coordination games does not lie in the alteration of incentives, but in the facilitation of
accurate expectations of one another.”).
2.
See, e.g., Samuel Bowles et al., Homo Reciprocans: A Research Initiative
on the Origins, Dimensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fairness, UMASS
AMHERST 1–4 (June 7, 2007), http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/homo.pdf; Dan
M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 333–34 (2001)
(citing Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic
Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EURO. ECON. REV. 845, 845–46 (1998));
Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in
Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154, 156–57 (1984).
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increasing the perception that others are cooperating—can be far more
effective in solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma.3
However, the second assumption—that the solution to the
Assurance Game lies in changing expectations expressively, rather than
by altering underlying payoffs or incentives—largely has
predominated.4 Although preplay communication, norms, and learning
have been suggested as potential solutions to the coordination dilemma,5
those solutions presuppose repeated interaction or the ability to identify
the other players. In diffuse, anonymous, non-repeat-player settings—
settings where the transaction costs are prohibitively high—the focus
has been on changing expectations by means of focal points.6 “Focal
points” are environmental features that attract the mutual attention of
the players and make salient one way of playing the game over others.7
To date, legal scholars generally have approached the Assurance
Game from the standpoint of law’s expressive function.8 Richard
McAdams, for instance, has applied the focal point theory to
coordination games, arguing that legal rules, by their mere expression,
can serve as “focal point[s] around which individuals can coordinate
their behavior.”9 Under this theory, when a legal rule is sufficiently

3.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community
Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1516–18 (2002).
4.
A notable exception is Lee Fennell’s discussion of locks, bribes, norms,
and pacts as potential strategies for solving collective action problems. Lee Anne
Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public
Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 45–53 (2001).
5.
Russell Cooper et al., Communication in Coordination Games, 107 Q.J.
ECON. 739 (1992); George J. Mailath, Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons
from Evolutionary Game Theory, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1348 (1998).
6.
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 231–34 (2009).
7.
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–67 (1960); see
also McAdams, supra note 6, at 231–32.
8.
See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 618; Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal:
A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 219 (2004);
McAdams, supra note 6, at 233–34; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–51 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, A
Focal Point Theory]; Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law,
79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory].
For articles dealing with law’s expressive function more generally, see, for example,
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Jason
Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
9.
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1651.
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publicized, it provides a salient focal point that allows individuals to
predict the likely behavior of others.10
This Article attempts to move beyond the expressive power of
legal rules to explore an alternative means of solving coordination
failures—the alteration of underlying payoffs or incentives. Law can
change incentives in at least two ways: (1) through coercive, punitive
sanctions; or (2) through risk-reducing mechanisms such as guarantees.
I argue that because of the inherently different nature of the Assurance
Game, mechanisms such as conditional money-back guarantees (MBGs)
may be particularly apt. I do not seek to challenge the role, or even the
primacy, of changing expectations through focal points and other
expressive theories, but simply to broaden the existing discourse to
include the adjustment of incentives.
By conditional MBGs, I refer not to the ubiquitous product-quality
money-back guarantee, but to guarantees that an individual’s monetary
contribution will be returned if an event or condition that depends on
the actions of others is met.11 The condition may be the reaching of a
predetermined threshold condition or the happening of some event. I
examine both types of conditional MBGs and analyze factors that may
impact their effectiveness, including the excludability of the good, the
public or private nature of the guarantor, and the guarantor’s credibility
of commitment.
By making it less risky to hunt stag if the other person does not do
so, conditional MBGs fundamentally change the dynamics of the
Assurance Game. They encourage individuals to move from the riskless
hare-hunting equilibrium to the riskier, but more rewarding
stag-hunting equilibrium by altering the underlying payoffs. By
minimizing or removing downside risk and changing the payoffs,
conditional MBGs thereby change expectations of what others will do.
Rather than making the normative argument that these types of
mechanisms should be adopted, this Article sets out a framework for
understanding how and under what circumstances these mechanisms
effectively operate.
Part I briefly summarizes the differences between the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Assurance Game. Those familiar with these games
should skip to Part II. Part II discusses coordination mechanisms and
examines two types of conditional MBGs: threshold and nonthreshold.

10.
Id. at 1666.
11.
This model also may be abstracted out as an assurance contract or
conditional pledge. Because assurance contracts have been proposed chiefly in relation
to the private provision of public goods, I have chosen to use the term “conditional
money-back guarantee” to describe this model.
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Part III analyzes factors that could influence the effectiveness of the
conditional MBG, including the type of good and the characteristics of
the guarantor. Part IV discusses larger implications, comparing the
conditional MBG to two other mechanisms for solving the Assurance
Game: focal points and sanctions. It then explores applications in other
areas, including crowdfunding and the emergence of new payment
technologies.
I. PRISONER’S DILEMMA VS. ASSURANCE GAME
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Assurance Game have frequently
been used to model collective action problems from a rational choice
perspective.12 Theorists employ these “two-by-two” games to study
strategic interaction between individuals who cannot communicate or
“enter into binding agreements with one another.”13 Although the
collective action setting involves many individuals, the interactions may
nevertheless be reduced to two-person games for the purposes of
analysis.14 I briefly summarize the differences between the two games
in terms of the nature of the problem, analytical structure and payoffs,
and proposed solutions.

A. Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been extensively applied to collective
action problems in which every individual acts rationally to advance his
or her own self-interest, yet the net result is collective (and ultimately
individual) harm. In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson
advanced the thesis that rational, self-interested individuals with a
common interest will not act in furtherance of the interests of the group
to which they belong.15 Instead, they will always free-ride on the
contributions of others absent coercion or other incentives.16 The public
goods problem and the tragedy of the commons exemplify this
dilemma.17 Whereas public goods involve individual costs that generate
12.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 188 (1994).
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 31–32.
15.
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1965).
16.
Id. at 2.
17.
I discuss public goods in more detail in Part III. The “tragedy of the
commons” refers to situations where individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete
a common resource. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1244 (1968).
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nonexcludable benefits shared by all, the tragedy of the commons
involves individual benefits that result in collective costs.18 Both have
been analyzed primarily as Prisoner’s Dilemmas, classic examples of
which range from tax and environmental compliance to the dynamics of
labor unions, plea bargaining, and pretrial discovery.19
Following is a classic illustration of the dilemma with the attendant
payoffs. Two prisoners have been arrested for a crime and placed in
separate cells. The prosecutor suspects them of having committed a
felony, but only has enough evidence to prove a misdemeanor. So, the
prosecutor offers each prisoner the following deal: If you confess and
the other stays silent, all charges against you will be dropped (payoff of
0, as shown in Table 1) and your testimony will be used to ensure that
the other prisoner gets the maximum penalty (payoff of -10). If both of
you cooperate and stay silent, you will each face one year in prison for
the misdemeanor (payoff of -1). If you both defect (confess), the judge
will be urged to be lenient and give you each five years in prison
(payoff of -5).20
Hence, if both prisoners stay silent, they are better off than if
neither of them do. However, each will be better off defecting
regardless of what the other player does: “[I]f Player 2 cooperates,
Player 1 is better off defecting [(payoff of 0)] . . . . If Player 2 defects,
Player 1 is [again] better off defecting [(payoff of -5)] . . . .”21
Defecting, then, becomes the strictly dominant strategy, though the end
result is to make both worse off.22 Both prisoners receive a payoff of
five years even though they could have received one year had they
cooperated with one another.

18.
Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN.
REV. SOC. 183, 188 (1998).
19.
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 1519–20; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108
YALE L.J. 377, 386–87 (1998).
20.
McAdams, supra note 6, at 215.
21.
Id. at 215–16.
22.
Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81
Q.J. ECON. 112, 122 (1967).
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TABLE 1
Player 1

Player 2

Cooperate
(Keep Silent)

Defect
(Confess)

Cooperate
(Keep Silent)

Defect
(Confess)

0, -10

-5, -5

-1, -1

-10, 0

The suboptimal nature of this (-5, -5) outcome has been used to
justify legal rules aimed at creating incentives not to defect.23
Conventional theory holds that the imposition of sanctions is necessary
to align selfish, though rational, individual interests with the collective
interests of society.24 Laws and regulations change the payoffs so that
defection is no longer the dominant strategy.25 However, a considerable
body of social science research has since challenged this theory and cast
doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions.26 These theorists have argued
that rather than promoting cooperation, sanctions dissipate trust and
increase the perception that others are not cooperating, thereby
triggering further noncooperation.27

B. Assurance Game
The Stag Hunt, or Assurance Game, models a separate problem of
strategic interaction—the problem of coordinating one’s actions with
others in situations where everyone does best by cooperating, but
otherwise should all defect.28 The players have common interests in that
they achieve the best outcome if they coordinate their actions and match
23.
BAIRD ET AL., supra note 12, at 188. To be clear, this (-5, -5) outcome is
suboptimal from the perspective of the defendants.
24.
Kahan, supra note 3, at 1518–19.
25.
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1650.
26.
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 162 (2000); Kahan, supra note 3, at 1516.
27.
Kahan, supra note 3, at 1519.
28.
Although the two are often equated, there are technical differences
between the two games. In the Assurance Game, if one player decides to defect, that
player is better off if the other player cooperates. In the Stag Hunt, each player prefers
cooperating to defecting, but only if the other cooperates as well. See BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 301, 315.

1144

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

strategies. If the other person cooperates, there is little incentive to
defect or free-ride.29 In this respect, the game is inherently different
from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the dominant strategy is to defect
no matter what the other player chooses to do.30
As shown in Table 2, the Assurance Game payoff structure
fundamentally differs from that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unlike the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, both players face the same binary choice and the
same payoffs. Each has a choice of hunting stag (Strategy A) or hunting
hare (Strategy B). Although a hare can be caught regardless of what the
other hunter does, there is no chance of catching a stag alone. Both
players have a common interest in catching stag (a better meal, hence a
superior equilibrium, with a payoff of 4). However, neither player can
be sure that the other will not act selfishly and go after the hare, in
which case the player who hunts stag will starve (payoff of 0).31
Hunting hare involves no such risk: the payoff is 3 regardless of what
the other player chooses.32
TABLE 2

Player 1

Player 2

Strategy
(Stag)
Strategy
(Hare)

Strategy
(Stag)
A 4, 4
B 3, 0

A Strategy
(Hare)
0, 3

B

3, 3

Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Assurance Game has no
strictly dominant strategy: it involves two stable Nash equilibria—(4, 4)
and (3, 3).33 If Player 2 hunts stag (i.e., cooperates), then Player 1 is
better off hunting stag and receiving a payoff of 4, rather than 3. If
Player 2 hunts hare (i.e., defects), it is better for Player 1 to hunt hare
29.
See id. at 35–36; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 231–32 (1978); McAdams, supra note 6, at 220–21.
30.
See BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 1–4 (2004); Brian Skyrms, The Assurance Game, 75 PROC. & ADDRESSES
AM. PHIL. ASS’N 31, 31–33 (2001).
31.
Skyrms, supra note 30, at 32.
32.
Id.
33.
Sen, supra note 22, at 122. A “Nash equilibrium” is a set of strategies
where no player has an incentive to choose a different strategy given the strategies of
the other players. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 12, at 310.
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and receive a payoff of 3, rather than 0. Whether the outcome will be
optimal (4, 4) or suboptimal (3, 3) depends on what each individual
expects the other to do.34 A player’s willingness to hunt stag will
depend on his assessment of the probability that the other player will
defect and hunt hare. Because of the riskiness of hunting stag, both
players could play it safe and hunt hare, thereby trapping them in the
inferior equilibrium.35 Players in the Assurance Game fail to coordinate
because they are unsure of what the other players will do, not because
they wish to take advantage of the other players.36 It is fear of getting
“suckered”—fear of being left in the lurch if the other person does not
cooperate—that traps individuals in the inferior hunting hare
equilibrium, though everyone would be better off hunting stag.37 The
solution, according to conventional theory, is to get each of the players
to expect that the other player will hunt stag.38 Mechanisms that can
assure each player that the other will cooperate and hunt stag are thus
central to solving the coordination dilemma.39
II. COORDINATION MECHANISMS
How can these assurances be fostered to the mutual benefit of the
players and the greater good of society? Where transaction costs are
low—such that there are few practical impediments to voluntary
exchange and bargaining between the parties—communication, norms,
and contracts provide the most obvious solutions.40 Communication, for
instance, has been shown to significantly increase cooperative behavior

34.
Sen, supra note 22, at 122.
35.
McAdams, supra note 6, at 220; see also SCHELLING, supra note 29, at
232 (“People can get trapped at an inefficient equilibrium, everyone waiting for the
others to switch, nobody willing to be the first unless he has confidence that enough
others will switch to make it worthwhile.”).
36.
Gary Bornstein & Zohar Gilula, Between-Group Communication and
Conflict Resolution in Assurance and Chicken Games, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 326, 331
(2003); Runge, supra note 2, at 155 (coordination problems require “assurance in the
face of uncertainty”).
37.
Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1171, 1171 (1986); see also Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free
Revelation or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L. & ECON. 147 (1975).
38.
SCHELLING, supra note 29, at 232.
39.
See id.; Mailath, supra note 5, at 1351 n.11; Skyrms, supra note 30, at
32.
40.
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697 (1996); Daniel F. Spulber, Consumer Coordination in the Small and in the
Large: Implications for Antitrust in Markets with Network Effects, 4 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 207 (2008).
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in a wide range of studies.41 Communication allows individuals to
gather information about the choices others are likely to make, to
commit to what they will do, and to persuade others to do the right
thing.42 In addition, it builds trust and “create[s] or reinforce[s] a sense
of group identity.”43 Social norms—informal systems of social
consensus of what ought or ought not to be done—perform a similar
function, “influenc[ing] the costs and benefits of particular choices” in
repeat-player settings.44 Contracts seek to ensure that both parties will
work to their mutual benefit by providing for legally enforceable
damages in the event of breach.45

A. Focal Points
But, when parties cannot readily communicate or bargain in
advance, what can effect this change of expectations? In The Strategy
of Conflict, Thomas Schelling advanced one potential solution: focal
points. Focal points are simply conspicuous, unique signals in the
environment that are mutually recognized by the players, thereby
coordinating their behavior.46 For instance, imagine that a husband and
wife become separated in a department store. According to focal point
theory, they would likely find one another if there were a conspicuous
sign saying that all persons who become separated should meet at the
information booth on the ground floor. This sign, according to
Schelling, would serve as the focal point that could coordinate actions
in the absence of communication.47
Richard McAdams’s focal point theory of expressive law posits
that legal rules guide behavior simply by changing expectations of how
other people will behave.48 For instance, consider a pure coordination

41.
See Bornstein & Gilula, supra note 36, at 337; Robyn M. Dawes et al.,
Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions about Other People’s Behavior in a
Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (1977);
Kollock, supra note 18, at 194.
42.
Kollock, supra note 18, at 194.
43.
Id.; see Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice
Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
44.
Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1997); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914
(1996).
45.
46.
47.
48.

BAIRD ET AL., supra note 12, at 56.
SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 57–58.
Id. at 66.
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1651.
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dilemma: the decision of whether to drive on the left- or right-hand side
of the road. To avoid a head-on collision, it is in the mutual interest of
both drivers to drive on the same side of the street—i.e., to drive on the
left if the other drives on the left, and to drive on the right if the other
drives on the right. If the drivers cannot communicate in advance and
no norm or convention has yet developed, focal points become
instrumental. In this case, McAdams argues, a simple proclamation by
the state saying, “drivers stay on the left,” even without the threat of
sanctions, could easily solve the coordination problem and create a
norm of drivers driving on the left.49 The legal proclamation serves as a
focal point that guides expectations—each driver drives on the left
because he expects the other to do so.50
This Article contends that this change of expectations can be
effected not only through focal points and other expressive theories of
law,51 but also by changing underlying payoffs. In certain situations, a
legal proclamation alone may be insufficient to change expectations.
Where an individual faces the prospect of a quantifiable monetary loss,
or where the challenges to achieving or maintaining cooperation are
particularly high, mechanisms such as conditional MBGs may be more
effective at solving the coordination dilemma. As demonstrated below,
unlike sanctions, conditional MBGs counter the core problem of fear in
the Assurance Game by reducing or eliminating the risk of losing one’s
financial investment.

B. Conditional MBGs
I distinguish between two types of money-back guarantees: (1)
product-quality, satisfaction-guaranteed MBGs; and (2) conditional
MBGs. Product-quality, satisfaction-guaranteed MBGs are what we
traditionally associate with MBGs in the consumer context. They
simply guarantee that if a buyer is not fully satisfied with a product or
service, she will receive a full refund of the purchase price.52 They
perform a signaling function, “signal[ing] product quality . . . when

49.
Id. at 1667–68.
50.
Id. at 1668.
51.
Other expressive theories include correlated equilibria and signaling
theory. See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1043.
52.
Scott Davis et al., Money Back Guarantees in Retailing: Matching
Products to Consumer Tastes, 71 J. RETAILING 7, 8 (1995).
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buyers cannot directly assess product quality before purchase.”53
Mail-order businesses, for instance, have made frequent use of
money-back guarantees to counter customers’ uncertainty about a
product’s quality at the point of purchase.54 Second, by deferring
finality of a purchase at point of sale, they reduce the risk associated
with purchasing an unknown product.55 They are perhaps the
prototypical antithesis of the old doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the
buyer beware.”
My focus is not on product-quality MBGs, but on the second
type—conditional MBGs. These are MBGs that take effect if some
predetermined event or condition that is dependent on the actions of
others is met. I discuss two types of conditional MBGs: (1) threshold
conditional MBGs—MBGs that are dependent on the reaching of some
preset threshold condition, and (2) nonthreshold conditional MBGs—
MBGs that are dependent on the happening of some event. In Section 1,
I introduce two examples of threshold conditional MBGs: (a) peer
purchasing in the consumer context, and (b) best-efforts underwriting in
the securities context. In Section 2, I discuss deposit insurance as a type
of nonthreshold conditional MBG.
1. THRESHOLD CONDITIONAL MBGS

a. Peer purchasing
In recent years, we have witnessed the rapid and dramatic growth
of an intriguing phenomenon: group buying, or what I term “peer
purchasing” in the spirit of Yochai Benkler’s apt phrase “peer
production.”56 In a seminal article, Benkler coined the term to describe
the then-emerging phenomenon of collaborative production systems.
These were systems operating outside of traditional markets or
managerial hierarchies that could coordinate the creative energy of
large numbers of diffuse, individual agents into complex productive
projects.57 I use the term “peer purchasing” to describe a similar
phenomenon: the use of the Internet to coordinate the purchasing power

53.
Sridhar Moorthy & Kannan Srinivasan, Signaling Quality with a
Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs, 14 MARKETING SCI. 442, 442
(1995).
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 442–43.
56.
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 376 (2002).
57.
Id. at 376–77.
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of large numbers of dispersed, autonomous agents for the purpose of
obtaining volume discounts.
The idea of allowing strangers to band together to purchase
products and services at bulk prices is by no means novel. Trade
associations and cooperative buying organizations (co-ops) formed to
pool the purchasing power of participating business existed for
centuries. In the 1920s, cooperative buying groups of small retail
grocers and other businesses were formed to counter the purchasing
power of large chain retailers.58
The online intermediary model popular today made its initial,
though short-lived debut in the late 1990s before dissolving during the
dot-com crash of 2001. Mercata, MobShop, and other web-based
group-buying companies allowed consumers to use their collective
buying power to obtain lower prices on various consumer products
listed on the companies’ sites.59 Instead of having a predetermined
price, each item listed on the companies’ websites showed a maximum
price and how many others had agreed to buy at that price. The larger
the number of buyers during the limited purchase period, the greater
the price drop for the customer.60
In China, tuángòu (pronounced “twango”), or team buying, has
become the latest shopping sensation. As of the first half of 2011, there
were nearly 5000 tuángòu websites in existence.61 The sites have taken
sundry forms, but in its original conception, tuángòu involved
aggressive bargain hunters finding one another over the Internet, then
agreeing to meet at a designated time and place to collectively pummel
a discount out of a willing or unwilling storeowner.62 The idea quickly
spread to online intermediary websites that negotiate discounts in

58.
Andrew C. Selden, An Analysis of Cooperative Buying Associations—
Including New Concerns for Franchise Systems, 37 BUS. LAW. 1569, 1570 (1982).
59.
See Dorte Toft, Shoppers Band Together on Mercata, IDG NEWS (May

20,
1999,
8:57
AM),
http://web.archive.org/web/19991008222307/http://
www.pcworld.com/pcwtoday/article/0,1510,11049,00.html;
Laurie
J.
Flynn,
MobShop, a Group-Buying Site, Drops Its Consumer Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/15/business/mobshop-a-groupbuying-site-drops-its-consumer-business.html.
60.
See Bruce Gottlieb, Does Group-Shopping Work?, SLATE (July 26, 2001,
3:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/briefing/articles/2000/07/does_groupshopping
_work.html.
61.
Tae-Hyung Kim et al., The Groupon Effect in China,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 3, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=2899.
62.
See Simon Montlake, China’s Newest Shopping Craze: ‘Team Buying,’
SCI.
MONITOR,
May
11,
2006,
available
at
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0511/p01s01-woap.html.
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advance in return for a fee of thirty to fifty percent of the whole deal,
similar to the Groupon business model.63 In one variation of tuángòu,
Air China introduced a promotional “V-Flight” in June 2011 that would
only fly if enough people signed up to purchase a seat between June 1
and June 15 on the popular microblogging site Sina.64 Purchasers were
given the option of selecting their meal options as well as members of
the cabin crew.65
In the United States, “peer purchasing” has taken the form of daily
deal websites featuring steep discounts on products and services in a
given geographical region. An online intermediary such as Groupon or
LivingSocial negotiates a discount with local businesses in advance of
the deal in return for a promise that the discount will not be offered
unless a certain minimum number of customers sign up.66 The model
differs from early group-buying companies such as Mercata and
MobShop, which focused on selling consumer goods such as personal
electronics, software, DVDs, and sports equipment over the course of
several weeks.67 Today’s generation of group-buying intermediaries
tends to focus more on services and leisure activities within a given
geographical region, with deals expiring within twenty-four hours. A
typical deal might offer a $20 voucher that can be redeemed for $40 in
value at a local restaurant, clothing store, or spa. The customer
purchases the voucher online with a credit card and, if the threshold
minimum number of purchasers is met, redeems it with the local
merchant.68 If the minimum threshold is not met, the individual’s credit
card is not charged and no one gets the deal of the day.69

63.
See Xu Fang & Jason Cheung, Tuangou-Revitalizing the Service Sector
and Stimulating Domestic Demand?, ACCENTURE INST. FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 1,
http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-TuangouRevitalizing-the-Service-Sector-and-Stimulating-Domestic-Demand.pdf (last visited Oct.
5, 2012).
64.
Chinese Airline’s Group-Buying Flight is Latest Example of ‘Tuangou
Fever,’ INDEPENDENT (June 6, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-andadvice/chinese-airlines-groupbuying-flight-is-latest-example-of-tangou-fever2293732.html. The flight took off on July 1, 2011, the first of its kind. See Air China’s
First V-Flight Airborne, AIR CHINA NEWS CENTER (July 5, 2011),
http://www.airchinagroup.com/en/news/07/203233.shtml.
65.
Id.
66.
See, e.g., FAQ, GROUPON, http://www.groupon.com/faq (last visited
Oct. 5, 2012); Terms and Conditions, LIVINGSOCIAL, https://www.livingsocial.com/
terms (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
67.
See Gottlieb, supra note 60.
68.
See FAQ, supra note 66.
69.
Id. Because the credit card is not charged until the deal “tips,” Groupon’s
model also could be characterized as a conditional pledge. However, for purposes of
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The conditional component of the peer purchasing model reduces
risk for both consumers and retailers. For retailers, it reduces risk
because the discounts can be offset by the quantity of goods or services
sold—the vouchers would, in effect, serve as quantity discounts in
addition to a form of advertising.70 For consumers, the group buying
model reduces risk because a consumer’s credit card is not charged
until the deal has “tipped,” or reached the minimum threshold.
Consumers can purchase the product or service with little to no risk of
monetary loss,71 thereby increasing their willingness to buy into the
deal.
Imagine a variant of Groupon, Gambleon. Gambleon operates in
exactly the same manner as Groupon, with one notable difference:
consumers buy into the deal without a guarantee that they will not be
charged if the threshold condition is not met. For instance, the
consumer buys a $10 voucher for $40 worth of value and hopes that
there will be enough other takers that the deal will go forward. If not,
the consumer will lose $10. Why would any consumer take such a
gamble?
Reducing the decision to a two-person, two-by-two game yields a
classic Assurance Game. There are two equilibria, one preferable to the
other, but the players’ rational decisions may not lead to the preferred
equilibrium. The best outcome would be for both Player 1 and Player 2
to cooperate by buying the coupon voucher. The worst outcome would
be for one player to buy, while the other defects by not buying.
Because the efficacy of the coupon depends on both players signing up,
the player who buys the coupon when the other player does not loses
his investment of $10. Neither player wishes to be the one “suckered,”
so both could refrain from buying the coupon (0, 0). The players defect
not out of a desire to take advantage of the other player, but out of fear
that the other player will defect.

the issues addressed in this Article, conditional MBGs and conditional pledges are
functionally the same.
70.
However, retailers would continue to face the risk that the deals would
attract mostly bargain hunters who do not spend more than the coupon’s face value and
do not become repeat customers.
71.
Consumers, of course, could lose out by neglecting to use their voucher
after purchase, but this would be a loss within their control.
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TABLE 3

Player 1

B (Buy)

Player 2
B
N
(Buy)
(Not Buy)
30, 30
-10, 0

N (Not Buy)

0, -10

0, 0

To establish the conclusion stated above, Table 3 displays the
payoffs. It is easy to see how the one-shot game with two rational,
self-interested players can end at the (0, 0) payoff instead of the more
advantageous (30, 30) payoff. Let p be Player 1’s assessment of the
probability that Player 2 cooperates (buys the voucher). If Player 1
buys the voucher, he gets $40 of value with probability p at a cost of
$10. His expected gain therefore is 40p - 10.72 If he does not buy, his
gain is $0. A risk-neutral Player 1 will buy the voucher as long as
40p -10 > 0, or p > 1/4. The same is true for Player 2. Both must
believe that the other has at least a twenty-five percent probability of
cooperating (buying the voucher) to achieve the optimal outcome.
Mechanisms such as conditional MBGs provide the assurance
necessary to move the players from the suboptimal (0, 0) to the optimal
(30, 30) equilibrium point, even when they doubt that the other player
is likely to cooperate. Groupon, LivingSocial, and other online
intermediaries achieve the same effect by guaranteeing that the
customer’s credit card will not be charged until the threshold condition
is reached. With the conditional MBG, if Player 1 buys the coupon
while Player 2 does not, Player 1’s payoff is 0 rather than -10.
Similarly, if Player 2 buys the coupon while Player 1 does not, Player
2’s payoff is 0 rather than -10. The conditional MBG alters the
underlying payoffs so that it is no longer an Assurance Game. For both
players, the clear choice, as shown in Table 4, is to buy the voucher,
with a (30, 30) payoff.

72.
If p is the probability that Player 2 buys, (1-p) is the probability that
Player 2 does not buy. Player 1’s expected payoff for buying equals 30(p) + (1-p)(-10)
= 40p-10. Player 1’s expected payoff of not buying equals 0(p) + (1-p)(0) = 0.
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TABLE 4

Player 2

Player 1

B (Buy)

N (Not Buy)

B (Buy)

30, 30

0, 0

N (Not Buy)

0, 0

0, 0

b. Best-efforts underwriting
The threshold conditional MBG model also has been implemented
in the securities context. Companies engaged in a public offering of
their securities may undertake either a firm commitment or a
best-efforts underwriting. In a firm commitment underwriting, the
underwriter purchases the securities from the issuer, then sells them to
the public, thereby assuming the risks of the offering.73 In a best-efforts
underwriting, the underwriter simply pledges to use its best efforts to
sell the securities, but does not purchase them.74 Best-efforts
underwritings may take various forms. In a conditional “mini/max”
best-efforts underwriting, a preset minimum number of shares must be
sold during a limited time period before an offering of securities can be
completed.75 If the underwriter does not succeed in selling the minimum
number of shares, the deal does not go forward and the funds are
returned to the investor.76 In an “all-or-none” best-efforts underwriting,
if the underwriter fails to sell all of the securities in the offering in the
required time, the funds are returned.77 By contrast, the “straight”
best-efforts offering does not incorporate the conditional threshold
aspects of the “mini/max” or “all-or-none” offerings. Any securities

73.
See Craig G. Dunbar, The Choice between Firm-Commitment and
Best-Efforts Offering Methods in IPOs: The Effect of Unsuccessful Offers, 7 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 60, 60 (1998), available at http://www.ivey.uwo.ca/faculty/CDunbar/
my_papers/withdrawn_IPO.pdf; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1561 n.42 (1989); Donald C. Langevoort,
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
747, 752 n.19 (1985).
74.
Dunbar, supra note 73, at 60–61.
75.
See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 120 (6th ed. 2009); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 85 n.11 (5th ed. 2004).
76.
See COX ET AL., supra note 75, at 120.
77.
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 85 n.11.
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sold by the underwriter are considered sold; there is no money-back
guarantee component.78
Both the “mini/max” and “all-or-none” best-efforts offerings
incorporate the conditional threshold MBG concept as a means of
countering risk. While large, established issuers have little trouble
finding underwriters to assume the risk of distribution and engage in
firm commitment underwritings, newer, more obscure companies enjoy
no such luxury.79 Take the case of an innovative, new electric car
company that needs to raise at least $100 million in order to purchase
the requisite machinery and raw materials to begin production. Not
only would underwriters most likely be unwilling to purchase the shares
directly from the company and assume the risk of a failed distribution,
but investors also could be skittish. An investor considering an
investment of $100 would want to part with his funds only if enough
other investors come in so that the $100 million is raised. If only $50
million is raised, the company cannot purchase the state-of-the-art
technology necessary to manufacture the cars, and the investor loses his
$100 investment.
If structured as a straight best-efforts offering, the investors face
an Assurance Game. As shown in Table 5, although everyone would be
better off if the $100 million is raised (20, 20), representing a twenty
percent return on the $100 investment, no one investor wishes to take
the risk that enough others will not invest. If Investor 1 chooses to buy
the shares, but Investor 2 does not, Investor 1 will lose his $100
investment (-100, 0). Because of the fear that the other investor will not
cooperate and buy the shares, each investor may choose to play it safe
and refrain from buying the shares (0, 0), a stable but value-decreasing
equilibrium.80
TABLE 5

Investor 2

Investor 1

B (Buy)
N (Not Buy)

B (Buy)
20, 20
0, -100

N (Not Buy)
-100, 0
0, 0

78.
See COX ET AL., supra note 75, at 120.
79.
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 76, at 85.
80.
Both investors must believe that the other has at least an 83.33%
probability of buying the shares in order to reach the optimal (20, 20) equilibrium.
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The conditional MBG component of the “mini/max” and
“all-or-none” best-efforts offerings effectively solve the dilemma. As
shown in Table 6, the conditional MBG removes the element of risk:
each investor no longer faces the risk that he will lose his investment if
enough other investors do not purchase shares in the offering. If
Investor 1 purchases the shares while Investor 2 does not, Investor 2’s
payoff becomes (0) rather than (-100). The dominant equilibrium is to
purchase the shares, with a payoff of (20, 20).
TABLE 6

Investor 1

B (Buy)
N (Not Buy)

Investor 2
B (Buy)
N (Not Buy)
20, 20
0, 0
0, 0
0, 0

“Mini/max” and “all-or-none” best-efforts offerings present
instances of private sector innovation by contract. Perhaps recognizing
the difficulties faced by new or obscure issuers in raising capital among
widely dispersed investors, underwriters and issuers devised a
mechanism that potentially could overcome, by contract, what would
otherwise have been limited capital formation prospects for these
companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission has implemented
measures to protect the integrity of the threshold requirement and the
money-back guarantee feature. Rule 10b-9 makes it “a manipulative or
deception device or contrivance” to sell a security on an “all-or-none”
or other conditional basis unless funds are promptly refunded to
customers in the event the conditions are not met.81 Additionally, Rule
15c2-4 provides that proceeds received in connection with
“all-or-none” or other conditional distributions must be kept in an
escrow account, with funds to be returned to investors if the
contingency does not occur.82
2. NONTHRESHOLD CONDITIONAL MBGS
The conditional element of the money-back guarantee could also
take the form of the happening of some event. I refer to these types of
money-back guarantees as nonthreshold conditional MBGs because they
81.
82.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (2012).
See § 240.15c2-4(b).
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are not contingent on the reaching of some predetermined threshold
condition. Deposit insurance, for instance, is a nonthreshold conditional
MBG because depositors receive their deposits back upon the
happening of an event—the failing of the bank—not upon the reaching
of a certain amount in deposits or number of total depositors.83
Although it has often been misidentified as a Prisoner’s
Dilemma,84 the bank run is in fact a classic Assurance Game.85 Imagine
a bank that is in danger of failing (in a world without deposit
insurance). Everyone would be better off keeping their money in the
bank—their funds would be safe, they would get interest, and they
would avoid the transaction costs of having to move their money to
another bank. However, no one knows what the other depositors will
do. If enough other depositors remove their funds from the bank, it
would be rational for a depositor to remove his funds too. Otherwise,
he would lose his entire deposit in the event the bank fails. The
difficulty of determining what the other depositors will do results in the
bank run.86
Table 7 illustrates the payoffs in a two-by-two game of two
depositors in a world without deposit insurance. Imagine two depositors
who each have $100 deposited in AA Bank, which is in imminent
danger of failing: if one more depositor withdraws his funds, the bank
will fail. However, the bank has only $100 in reserves remaining, so if
both depositors try to withdraw their deposits at once, they will each
only receive $50. Depositor 1 has two choices: he can keep his money
in the bank (K) or take it out (T). His choice is influenced by what he
thinks Depositor 2 will do. If Depositor 2 keeps his money in,
Depositor 1 will be better off keeping his money in and getting a net
payoff of $10 (representing ten percent interest on his $100), rather
than taking it out and getting a payoff of 0. If Depositor 2 takes his
money out, Depositor 1 will be better off taking his money out as well,
thereby receiving a payoff of -$50 rather than -$100. Both players are
better off if they keep their money in the bank (10, 10), but because of
the risk of a -$100 outcome if one depositor keeps his money in while
83.
When a Bank Fails – Facts for Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers,
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). A
related example is presented by home equity insurance plans intended to protect
homeowners against loss in property values caused by white flight. See Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 2005–08
(2000).
84.
See McAdams, supra note 6, at 217.
85.
Id. at 221.
86.
Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
323, 359–60 (2011).
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the other takes it out (0, -100) or (-100, 0), both depositors may choose
to take their money out (-50, -50), in which case the bank will fail.
TABLE 7
NO DEPOSIT INSURANCE

Depositor 2
K (Keep In) T (Take Out)
Depositor 1

K (Keep In)
T (Take Out)

10, 10
0, -100

-100, 0
-50, -50

Again, there are two stable equilibria, (10, 10) and (-50, -50).
Confronted with this Table, Depositor 1 reasons as follows: My
estimate of the probability that Depositor 2 will keep his money in the
bank is some number p. If I choose K, my expected gain is
10p + (-100)(1 - p) = 110p - 100. If I choose T, my expected gain is
0p + (-50)(1 - p) = 50p - 50. If I want to maximize my expected gain,
I should choose K if 110p - 100 > 50p - 50. Solving for p, I conclude
that I should keep the money in the bank as long as p > 5/6 or
83.33%. Unless every depositor is nearly certain that the other
depositors will cooperate by leaving their money in the bank, there will
be a run on the bank.
Notice here that unlike Tables 2, 3, and 5 above, the bank run
Assurance Game presents a slightly different preference ordering. Each
depositor does best if everyone cooperates and keeps their money in
(10, 10). However, if Depositor 1 decides to defect and remove his
money, he receives a higher payoff if the other depositor cooperates
and keeps his money in (0) than if they both defect (-50). The worst
outcome is if Depositor 1 cooperates and the other depositor defects
(-100). In Tables 2, 3, and 5 above, the player who defects receives the
same payoff regardless of whether the other player cooperates or
defects. Hence, the bank run presents a more fragile cooperative
outcome: in the face of uncertainty of what the other depositors will do,
each depositor has an added incentive to essentially “outrun” the other
depositors and get his deposit out ahead of the others. This arguably
increases the need for robust, payoff-altering mechanisms such as the
conditional MBG.
Deposit insurance—which, from the depositor’s standpoint, is a
money-back guarantee conditional on the bank’s failure—transforms the
game from an Assurance Game to one in which the other players’
choices are irrelevant. With deposit insurance, if Depositor 1 keeps his
money in the bank while Depositor 2 takes it out, Depositor 1’s net
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payoff is $10 rather than -$100.87 Rather than facing the prospect of
losing his $100 deposit, Depositor 1 can rest assured that in the event
the bank fails, he will receive a return of his full deposit plus accrued
interest, provided it is within deposit insurance coverage limits.88
Deposit insurance obviates the need to coordinate with the other
players—it takes the risk out of keeping the money in the bank even if
the other depositor does not do so. In other words, “deposit insurance
prevents runs because . . . participating in the run [does not] pay[].”89
Table 8 shows the change in payoffs brought about by the
introduction of deposit insurance. Because each depositor will receive
$10 rather than lose $100 by keeping the deposit in regardless of what
the other depositor does, there will be no run on the bank.90 The
depositors will arrive at the optimal equilibrium point (10, 10).
TABLE 8
ITH
D
EPOSIT
INSURANCE
W

Depositor 2

Depositor 1

K (Keep In)
T (Take Out)

K
(Keep In)
10, 10
0, 10

T
(Take Out)
10, 0
0, 0

The depositor’s calculus no longer turns on the expected actions of
other depositors. Hence, nonthreshold MBGs that are contingent on the
happening of some event also may be effective mechanisms for solving
the Assurance Game.

87.
The converse is also true. If Depositor 1 takes his money out while
Depositor 2 keeps it in, Depositor 2’s payoff is $110 rather than -$100.
88.
Currently, the maximum coverage is $250,000 per depositor, per insured
bank, for each account ownership category. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. IV
2010).
89.
Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 21 (2000).
90.
The source of the payout should be irrelevant to the utility maximizer—in
the event of bank failure, a rational person should not care whether he or she is paid by
the FDIC or by the bank.
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III. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MBGS
The analysis of Part II is, of course, oversimplified. For example,
one cannot be certain that the conditional MBG will be paid,91 and it is
not costless to enforce it. For both threshold and nonthreshold MBGs,
the effectiveness of the MBG may be influenced by a variety of other
factors. I discuss two such factors below: (1) the type of good, and (2)
the characteristics of the guarantor. I conclude that the excludability of
the good and the guarantor’s credibility of commitment are most
critical.

A. Type of Good
In economic terms, goods can be public, private, or mixed. A
“public good” is one that benefits everyone rather than just those who
pay for it.92 Clean air, national defense, and public television are classic
examples. Two key features characterize public goods: they are (1)
nonrivalrous, meaning that one person’s use of the good does not
diminish its use or enjoyment by another person; and (2)
nonexcludable, meaning that those who do not contribute to the good
cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits.93 By contrast, “private
goods” are both rivalrous and excludable. “Mixed goods” may be
rivalrous, but not excludable (“common goods”) or nonrivalrous, but
excludable (“club goods”),94 as shown in Table 9 below.
TABLE 9

Rivalrous
Nonrivalrous

Excludable

Nonexcludable

Private Goods
Club Goods

Common Goods
Public Goods

Conditional MBGs operate differently depending on whether they
involve nonexcludable (public and common) goods or excludable
(private or club) goods. Below, I analyze the relevance of excludability

91.
Of course, if every depositor in the country were to simultaneously
withdraw all of their money from their banks, the government would be unable to
shoulder the burden.
92.
Kollock, supra note 18, at 188.
93.
Id. at 188–89; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 19, at 377.
94.
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822–24 (2010).
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on the effectiveness of the conditional MBG in solving the Assurance
Game.
1. NONEXCLUDABLE GOODS
Conditional MBGs for nonexcludable goods—e.g., public and
common goods—suffer from a potentially fatal defect: free-riding, a
problem that has long been studied in the Prisoner’s Dilemma context.
Imagine a group of state system faculty members who wish to raise
money to retain a lobbyist at the state legislature.95 The faculty seeks to
encourage contributions by guaranteeing that any contributions would
be returned if a minimum target of $30,000—the amount needed to
retain the lobbyist—is not met. However, any noncontributing faculty
members would nevertheless benefit because any pay increases
produced by the lobbyist would inure to the benefit of the entire
faculty.96 Experimental results indicate that in such a situation, where
the temptation to free-ride remains, a money-back guarantee would not
be an effective means of inducing members to contribute.97 The
money-back guarantee proves to be self-defeating: many faculty
members assume that the guarantee makes it even more likely that other
faculty members will contribute, making their own contributions
unnecessary.98 In short, expectations of the money-back guarantee’s
success undermine its very success.99
The classic response to the problem of free-riding is government
coercion or sanctions.100 However, numerous private mechanisms have
been proposed, including enforced contribution,101 conditionally binding
assurance contract,102 and dominant assurance contract.103
The “enforced contribution” or “fair share” method stipulates that
if a certain threshold number of individuals contribute to a good, all

95.
This example is taken from an experimental study conducted by Robyn
Dawes. See Dawes et al., supra note 37, at 1172.
96.
Id.
97.
See id. at 1171, 1183.
98.
Id. at 1174.
99.
Id. at 1183.
100. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 19, at 377; McAdams, A Focal Point
Theory, supra note 8, at 1650.
101. Dawes et al., supra note 37, at 1172.
102. David Schmidtz, Contracts and Public Goods, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 475, 476 (1987).
103. Alexander Tabarrok, The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant
Assurance Contracts, 96 PUB. CHOICE 345, 345 (1998).
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others must do so.104 Labor unions and condominium conversions are
two examples. If a majority of workers vote to be represented by a
union, “even those who voted against unionization are compelled . . .
to pay union dues.”105 Similarly, with condominium conversions, if a
sufficient number of residents “contribute” to the apartment dwellers’
effort by withstanding the developer’s buyout offer, the conversion
does not occur.106 Enforced contributions have been found to be far
more effective than money-back guarantees, presumably because they
remove the possibility of free-riding.107
Assurance contracts, which make contributions contingent on some
preset threshold being reached, have been suggested to encourage the
private provision of public goods. “[C]onditionally binding assurance
contract[s are] contractual agreement[s] to contribute to . . . public
goods project[s].”108 Contributions are enforced only if enough people
agree to contribute so that the project’s total funding produces a return
that exceeds costs.109 Take, for instance, conditional charitable pledges.
A philanthropist pledges to give to a charity or other organization if the
organization raises a certain amount from other sources. For example,
a donor agrees to a matching pledge of $500,000 to fund a new
university research facility, contingent upon ten other donors making
the same pledge. If the condition is not met, the university does not
receive the $500,000 and the facility is not built. The research facility
is a public good in that those who do not donate may still benefit from
the good, a classic free-rider problem.
Similarly, threshold pledge systems, which are functionally
equivalent to conditional MBGs, have been successfully applied to fund
creative works in the public domain. A public good—the artist’s work—
is provided once a predetermined amount of money is raised through
individual contributions. Mozart, for instance, funded new works and
concerts partly by requiring a threshold amount of contributions or
subscriptions before the work would be produced or the concert
given.110 Today, such websites as SellaBand.com promote the same
idea: a band announces a set fundraising goal for a project, be it a new

104. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 42
(1989).
105. Id.
106. Dawes et al., supra note 37, at 1172.
107. Id. at 1183.
108. Schmidtz, supra note 102, at 483.
109. Id. at 484.
110. See OTTO ERICH DEUTSCH, MOZART: A DOCUMENTARY BIOGRAPHY
205–06, 212 (Eric Blom et al. trans., 1965).
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album or a tour, and fans contribute online through the site.111 If the
threshold goal is not met, the band does not produce the album and the
fans can contribute their funds to a different project on the site.112 At
any time before the goal is reached, contributing fans may withdraw
their funds, but once it is reached, the funds are released and are
nonreturnable.113 If the threshold is met and the good is produced, the
artist’s work becomes available for all to enjoy.114
One proposed solution to the free-rider problem has been to
require unanimous contribution from all the players in order for any
contribution to be enforceable.115 However, this approach suffers the
drawback of holdouts. A single noncontributor could prevent the good
from coming into existence at all. Economist Alexander Tabarrok
proposes an alternative: dominant assurance contracts. If the threshold
condition is not met, everyone who contributed to the public good is
given their money back plus a bonus.116 Regardless of what the players
believe the other players will do, they will have an incentive to accept
the contract because of the bonus.117 In the SellaBand example above,
pledgors could be induced to contribute by being rewarded with free
MP3 downloads or other small incentives in order to discourage
free-riding.118
2. EXCLUDABLE GOODS
In contrast to nonexcludable goods, excludable goods do not suffer
from free-riding and are thus not as susceptible to self-defeating
negative expectations. With both club goods and private goods, the
conditional MBG could be an effective device to encourage
contributions because it would not be undermined by self-seeking
behavior.

111. See How It Works, SELLABAND, http://www.sellaband.com/en/pages/
how_it_works (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
112. See Jeroen van Doom, Believer FAQ, SELLABAND (May 7, 2010, 2:02
PM), http://support.sellaband.com/entries/168648-believers-f-a-q.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. ELSTER, supra note 104, at 42.
116. See Tabarrok, supra note 103, at 348.
117. Id. at 350.
118. See How It Works, supra note 111; Eric Crampton, Assurance Contracts
and Dominant Assurance Contracts, OFFSETTING BEHAVIOUR (Nov. 26, 2010, 7:00
AM),
http://offsettingbehaviour.blogspot.com/2010/11/assurance-contracts-anddominant.html.
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Online coupon intermediaries such as Groupon and LivingSocial
offer mostly club goods. They are excludable because if an individual
does not buy into the deal, he or she cannot benefit from it. They are
nonrivalrous because each person’s consumption does not affect the
next person’s consumption or enjoyment (at least until reaching a point
of congestion).119 Similarly, deposit insurance qualifies as a club good.
It is excludable because only bank depositors can benefit from the
insurance coverage. Although there is a larger societal benefit to
avoiding bank runs and maintaining a stable banking system, an
individual who does not retain funds at the bank cannot directly benefit
from deposit insurance. It is nonrivalrous because each depositor can
enjoy deposit insurance without diminishing the ability of others to
benefit from it as well.

B. Characteristics of Guarantor
In addition to the type of good, certain characteristics of the
guarantor can also influence the effectiveness of the conditional MBG.
Below, I examine two factors: (1) whether the guarantor is public or
private, and (2) the degree to which the guarantor can credibly commit
to the MBG. I suggest below that the ability of the guarantor to credibly
commit is more important than its public or private nature.
1. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE GUARANTOR
Does the identity of the actor—whether the guarantor is public or
private—bear on the effectiveness of the conditional MBG? A public or
quasi-public guarantor could have the advantage of inducing greater
trust and confidence, as well as being easier to monitor and control than
wholly private entities. But this is not always the case. Some have
argued that because deposit insurance requires “authority to tax or
create money to pay deposit insurance,” deposit insurance ought to be
offered by the government.120 Private parties such as insurance
companies do not have the power of taxation, so they must hold
reserves to make credible a promise to provide deposit insurance.121

119. Vouchers for restaurants, spa appointments, haircuts, movie tickets, etc.
are excludable and nonrivalrous (up to the point of reaching the threshold required for
the deal to tip), but could become rivalrous after reaching a point of congestion.
Discount vouchers for cable TV or satellite radio would be pure club goods because
they are excludable but nonrivalrous.
120. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 89, at 20.
121. Id.
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Yet, the federal deposit insurance fund is not financed through tax
dollars, but through “premiums that banks and thrift institutions pay for
deposit insurance coverage.”122 Conceivably, a private entity with a
record of trust and reliability could assess the premiums and manage
the deposit insurance fund, much like a typical insurance company.123
The success of innovative private networks such as the Certificate
of Deposit Account Registry Service (CDARS) casts further doubt on
the salience of the public-private distinction. CDARS is a program
sponsored by Promontory Interfinancial Network, a network of more
than 3000 financial institutions connected to allow each member
institution to compete more efficiently.124 CDARS allows depositors to
spread large deposits out among as many different member institutions
as necessary to qualify for deposit insurance coverage.125 For instance,
if a customer were to deposit $5 million in a depository institution,
normally only $250,000 of that amount would be eligible for federal
deposit insurance. However, if the customer were to deposit that $5
million through a CDARS network member bank, the entire amount
would be insured because twenty different network banks would each
issue a certificate of deposit of $250,000. The FDIC has issued an
advisory opinion agreeing that deposits placed through the CDARS
system would be insured on a pass-through basis.126
Although the CDARS network ultimately relies on federal deposit
insurance, it shows how private actors can refashion and improve upon
goods offered by public actors. One could easily imagine a system
whereby reputable private actors such as Promontory Interfinancial
Network could assess and pool premiums paid by its members to
provide private deposit insurance. The success of private online
intermediaries such as Groupon and LivingSocial is further indication
122. See Who Is the FDIC?, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/
(last updated Aug. 11, 2010).
123. Deposit insurance is technically more of a “guaranty” rather than
insurance because “premiums are levied against the bank . . . not the
beneficiary-depositor, and are not . . . ascertainable on an actuarial basis . . . .”
Legislation, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 n.3 (1936); see also Guy Emerson, Guaranty
of Deposits under the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Q.J. ECON. 229, 229 (1934).
124. See
Overview,
PROMONTORY
INTERFINANCIAL
NETWORK,
http://www.promnetwork.com/about-us/overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
125. See CDARS Overview, PROMONTORY INTERFINANCIAL NETWORK,
http://www.promnetwork.com/our-services/cdars/overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 6,
2012).
126. Joseph A. DiNuzzo, Do ‘Pass Through’ Deposit Insurance Rules Apply to
Funds Placed in the ‘Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service,’ FDIC (July 29,
2003)
(advisory
opinion),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/400010220.html.
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that the offeror of the conditional MBG need not be public, particularly
when the good is a consumer item.
2. CREDIBILITY OF COMMITMENT
Rather than the public or private nature of the actor, credibility of
commitment may be more probative of the effectiveness of the
conditional MBG. I identify three elements underlying credibility of
commitment: (1) capacity, (2) will, and (3) reputation. Does the public
or private actor have the capacity or resources at its disposal to honor
its commitment? Second, even if the actor has the capacity to commit,
does it have the will or resolve to do so? Third, does the actor possess a
reputational foundation that stems from its past record (or lack of
record)?
Although public actors are often perceived to be more trustworthy,
the public nature of the actor does not necessarily imply credibility of
commitment. Take, for instance, the Icelandic financial crisis of 2008,
when both capacity and will were lacking. In October 2008, all three of
Iceland’s major commercial banks—Kaupthing Bank, Landsbanki, and
Glitnir Bank—failed.127 The government lacked the capacity to
guarantee deposits because years of speculation had resulted in “the
assets of the three . . . banks [being] 11 times greater than the entire
$14 billion GDP of the nation.”128 When the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands demanded that the country stand behind the $5.5 billion
owed to foreign depositors of Icesave, the online arm of Landsbanki,
the voters (and the President) simply rejected the parliamentary bill
committing to repay the amount owed.129 This demonstrated lack of
will, combined with the government’s inability to honor its deposit
guarantee, had far-reaching consequences for the government’s
credibility of commitment.
A similar fate befell Ireland’s banking system. In September 2008,
the Irish government extended a blanket guarantee to all bank deposits
and bonds, without limit.130 The government had the will to save the
banks, but not the capacity. The three largest Irish banks had a total
127. Bruce Walker, Lesson from Iceland’s 2008 Financial Crisis: Let Banks
Fail, NEW AM. (Nov. 9, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-

news/europe/item/8874-lesson-from-icelands-2008-financial-crisis-let-banks-fail.html.
128. Id.
129. Icelandic Finance: Is It a Blizzard?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9–15, 2010, at 52,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15213434.
130. Tom Petruno, European Banks Get Needed Help, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2008, at C4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/01/business/fimoneyblog1.
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balance sheet twice the size of the Irish economy, effectively
discrediting the government’s claims.131 A run on the banks ensued,
leading to a bailout by the European Union and International Monetary
Fund in November 2010.132
Today, the United States has the capacity, will, and reputation to
honor the deposit insurance guarantee, but this has not always been the
case. Both Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt
had the same or similar resources on hand to deal with the banking
crisis of the early 1930s, but differed in their will and reputational
capital. Hoover believed in limited government intervention, telling
Congress in 1930 that the road to economic recovery lay not in
legislative or executive action, but in voluntary cooperative action by
the producers and consumers themselves.133 James Sundquist argues
that disapproval of Hoover was so widespread by 1932 that the election
of an activist administration was inevitable.134 Whereas Roosevelt
benefited in many ways from the absence of a record of failure, Hoover
lacked reputation due in large part to his long record of ineffectiveness
in dealing with the crisis.135
Credibility can be undermined when capacity or reputation alone
are lacking. A recent example of the loss of capacity was the February
22, 2010 bankruptcy of SellaBand, the Dutch music startup that allowed
fans to invest in their favorite bands.136 Although the company, acting
partly as an online record label, “kept one third of revenue from the
sale of released albums,” as well as interest earned on escrow accounts
before the funding goal was met, it nevertheless failed to make a
profit.137 The company survived in large part due to its acquisition by

131. Simon Johnson, Geithner’s Gamble, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/geithner-s-gamble (explaining that, in
Ireland, “banks built balance sheets valued at two times Irish GDP”).
132. Ireland’s Crash: After the Race, ECONOMIST, Feb. 19–25, 2011, at 25,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18176072.
133. See President Herbert Hoover, Annual Message to the Congress on the
State of the Union (Dec. 2, 1930), in 1 PUB. PAPERS 509, 511–13, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22458.
134. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT
AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES 195–96 (1973).
135. AMOS KIEWE, FDR'S FIRST FIRESIDE CHAT: PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND THE
BANKING CRISIS 33 (2007); see DAVID W. HOUCK, RHETORIC AS CURRENCY: HOOVER,
ROOSEVELT, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 54–93 (2001).
136. Patrick de Laive, Sellaband Files for Bankruptcy, NEXT WEB (Feb. 23,
2010), http://thenextweb.com/eu/2010/02/23/sellaband-deadpool-files-bankruptcy/.
137. Eliot Van Buskirk, Bankrupt, Crowd-Funded SellaBand Acquired by
German Investors, WIRED (Feb. 24, 2010, 6:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/
2010/02/bankrupt-crowd-funded-sellaband-acquired-by-german-investors/.
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German investors within days of its bankruptcy, and has continued as a
going concern under new management.138
Similarly, a loss of reputation can occur when the provider of the
conditional MBG does not make good on its promises. For instance,
Fundable.com, a website intermediary devoted to aggregating funds
online for various fundraising projects, suffered a considerable loss of
reputation in 2009 when it failed to promptly credit the account of a
well-known author, who had used Fundable to raise money to purchase
a new computer.139 Fundable had adopted the conditional pledge or
conditional MBG model, promising contributors that they would not be
charged until the money raised had reached a preset threshold
amount.140 If the target was reached, the donation was collected, and
Fundable kept ten percent of the proceeds.141 The problems began when
users reported that even after they had received confirmation that the
pledges had reached the target amount, they failed to receive prompt
payment from Fundable.142 The negative publicity associated with the
incident culminated in the dissolution of the company in October
2009.143 Although like SellaBand, the company reinvented itself as
Fundable.org and has survived under new management, the
consequences of the company’s loss of credibility are still being felt.144
These examples suggest that credibility of commitment plays a larger
role in the success of the conditional MBG than the public or private
nature of the actor.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The preceding Sections have identified several factors that impact
the effectiveness of the conditional MBG—the excludability of the good
138.
139.

Id.

Mary Robinette Kowal, My Experience with Fundable.com, MARY
ROBINETTE KOWAL (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.maryrobinettekowal.com/journal/myvery-bad-experience-with-fundable-com/.
140. FAQ, FUNDABLE, http://www.fundable.com/FAQ#FEE_STRUCTURE
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
141. Krysten Crawford, Fund-Raising Goes Peer-to-Peer, BUS. 2.0 MAG. (Mar.
1, 2006), available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/
2006/03/01/8370559/index.htm; see also The Sad Story of Fundable.com, BLUE SKY
COLLABORATIVE (Oct. 19, 2009), http://blueskycollaborative.typepad.com/blog/2009/
10/the-sad-story-of-fundablecom.html.
142. See, e.g., heatherknox, Comment to Is Fundable.com a Scam?, MYLOT,
http://www.mylot.com/w/discussions/1936462.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
143. See Online Fundraising, FUNDABLE.ORG, http://www.fundable.org/
online-fundraising (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
144. Id.
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and the characteristics of the guarantor. In this Part, I offer some
preliminary thoughts on the larger implications of understanding
conditional MBGs as a solution to the coordination dilemma. Below, I
highlight the advantages of the conditional MBG relative to two other
mechanisms—focal points and sanctions. I then analyze the substance of
the distinction between incentives and expectations. Finally, I explore
the application of conditional MBGs to two areas that have suffered
from coordination failures—capital formation and the introduction of
new payment technologies.

A. MBGs, Focal Points, and Sanctions
1. MBGS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOCAL POINTS
Recognizing that expectations can be changed not only through
focal points, but also by changing incentives, can be valuable for
several reasons. In certain situations—for example, where an individual
faces the risk of a discrete, quantifiable monetary loss, or where there
are added barriers to achieving or maintaining cooperation—law’s
expressive capacity may not be sufficiently robust to move individuals
away from suboptimal equilibria. Where the incentives are such that
achieving cooperation in the first place is difficult, payoff-altering
mechanisms may be particularly valuable.
Take, for instance, the classic bank run. Not only can individuals
quantify the amount of money they have at risk, but also cooperation
may be more difficult due to the dynamics of the game. Although
depositors know that they will all receive the highest payoff if everyone
keeps their money in the bank, they also know that they will receive the
second-highest payoff if they defect and take their money out before the
others. This added dimension increases uncertainty and renders the
cooperative outcome inherently more unstable and fragile. In such a
situation, the expressive theory of law would appear to have less force.
A simple pronouncement by the state that funds will be safe most likely
will be inadequate to stop the run and solve the coordination dilemma.
Indeed, history has proven as much. By 1933, despite desperate
government efforts, more than 11,000 of the nation’s 25,330 banks had
collapsed after millions of Americans had withdrawn their deposits.145
Similarly, where there is real uncertainty about whether the other
players wish to cooperate in the first place, threshold conditional MBGs

145. THOMAS E. HALL & J. DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AN
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER OF PERVERSE ECONOMIC POLICIES 83 (1998).
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may be particularly useful. In certain situations, the desirability of the
superior equilibrium may be more apparent than in others. Consider the
example of an insurgency under a tyrannical or oppressive regime, or
African-Americans during the civil rights movement—both of which
have been modeled as Assurance Games.146 In both situations, the
preferences of the other members are known. The challenge is
countering the fear that enough others will not participate. In such a
situation, the expressive presence of a charismatic and magnetic leader
can be an extraordinarily powerful coordinating force.147
Contrast this with an offering of securities in an unknown and
risky company, or a daily deal offer for fly fishing. Players are less
certain of the preferences of the members, although if enough
like-minded players can come together, it would be an optimal outcome
for those players. If individuals could be certain that enough other
people have a preference for the offered item, simply announcing the
deal could suffice. However, in the absence of such certainty, the
threshold conditional MBG serves a useful function in eliciting
information about whether enough people are interested to make
cooperation worthwhile. In this respect, the conditional MBG
mechanism proves instrumental in achieving initial cooperation. Thus,
in situations of heightened uncertainty or where individuals face the
prospect of some quantifiable loss, mechanisms that change underlying
incentives and directly target that fear of loss may be particularly
effective.
2. MBGS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SANCTIONS
In addition, mechanisms such as conditional MBGs may be a more
effective means than sanctions for altering incentives. The state
traditionally employs sanctions to change payoffs so as to deter
individuals from defecting.148 An example of sanctions in the Assurance
Game context would be to charge a penalty of ten percent of deposited
funds if an individual withdraws funds during a restricted period, such
as during a potential bank run. But sanctions are costly and their
effectiveness has been called into question in at least some
circumstances.149 By providing individuals the assurance that they will
not lose out even if others do not cooperate, conditional MBGs may
146. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1991).
147. Id. at 234–35.
148. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1650.
149. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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present a more effective or less costly alternative to sanctions. Not only
can they be as easily offered by private as by public actors, but they
also perform an inherently different function than sanctions. Sanctions
in effect counter fear with more fear, whereas conditional MBGs
counter fear with assurances.
As noted above, in certain situations, such as where credibility of
commitment has been impaired, conditional MBGs may not be a
feasible or effective means of coordinating individual behavior. A
deposit insurance guarantee from a country like Iceland or Greece does
not possess the same weight—in terms of the ability to prevent a bank
run—as from a country like the United States or the United Kingdom.
In those situations, sanctions may prove to be a more appropriate tool
for changing incentives.

B. Incentives vs. Expectations
Is there a real difference between changing incentives and
changing expectations? In many situations, there is considerable
overlap: changing incentives or payoffs (gains or losses), can change
expectations.150 However, expectations can be changed without
changing incentives, as suggested by expressive theories of law.151 As
we have seen, changing payoffs alters the game so that it is no longer
an Assurance Game; changing expectations does not.152 One way of
conceiving the difference is to consider the extreme situation in which
payoffs are changed so much that the individual no longer cares what
other people will do. With nonthreshold conditional MBGs such as
deposit insurance, rational persons should no longer care how other
depositors behave, as long as the government can credibly commit. If
the government cannot credibly commit, however, the underlying risk
of losing one’s funds remains, and the depositor continues to fear the
consequences of resisting the stampede.
By contrast, with threshold conditional MBGs, where the
guarantee is contingent on some predetermined threshold condition
being reached, even after the underlying payoffs are changed, rational
150. In economic terms, the expectation (E) is the probability value (p),
multiplied by the payoff (µ). I am arguing that expectations can be changed by altering
the payoff (µ), rather than by changing the probability value (p) (what one player
believes to be the likelihood of what the other player will do—i.e., the probability that a
particular payoff (µ) will be realized). Expressive theorists are changing the probability
value (p), the beliefs of the agents; I am discussing changes to the underlying payoff
(µ).
151. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
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individuals will still care how other individuals behave. With the
dominant peer purchasing model in existence today, even though the
buyer is assured against losing a financial investment, concern over the
purchasing behavior of others continues at least until the threshold
condition is met. Online coupon intermediaries such as Groupon and
LivingSocial address this concern by providing a visible forum for
coordination: anyone can track in real time how many others have
bought into the deal.153
Conditional MBGs may be viewed as mechanisms that alter both
incentives and expectations. By removing, or at least minimizing,
downside risk, conditional MBGs change underlying payoffs, resulting
in a shift in expectations. Even though it minimizes underlying risk, the
very existence of deposit insurance changes individuals’ expectations of
what other depositors will do. Likewise, purchasers are more likely to
buy into Groupon’s deals because they expect that other purchasers will
be attracted by the risk-reducing features of the conditional MBG.

C. Crowdfunding and New Payment Technologies
In this Section, I explore the application of conditional MBGs to
two areas that have suffered from coordination failures: capital
formation and the introduction of new payment technologies.
1. ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL FORMATION: CROWDFUNDING
Conditional MBGs have been implemented in a number of
different areas, including alternative modes of financing such as
crowdfunding. “Crowdfunding” refers to the pooling of money from
disparate sources outside of traditional public markets.154 The idea of
aggregating small amounts of money from a large number of people has
long been associated with charitable projects, but has in recent years
expanded to general fundraising, lending, and capital formation efforts.
On websites such as Kickstarter.com, Indiegogo.com, Sponsume.com,
and ThePoint.com, individuals can pledge money to fund campaigns or
creative projects in music, art, film, technology, design, and

153. See, e.g., 5 Things about Groupon, SQUIDOO, http://www.squidoo.com/5things-about-groupon (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
154. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit:

Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 45 & n.240 (2011).

1172

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

publishing, among other fields.155 If the total amount pledged reaches a
preset threshold, the project is “on”—pledges are collected and the
project or campaign is developed; if the threshold amount is not
reached, the pledges are refunded from the intermediary’s escrow
account.156
In August 2007, MyFootballClub (MyFC) initiated a worldwide
Internet campaign to gather a minimum threshold of 50,000 football
enthusiasts to collectively purchase an English association football club,
Ebbsfleet United.157 In return for their investments, members were
promised the ability to exercise control over the football club through a
democratic voting process conducted over the Internet.158 The idea was
a success. In January 2008, 95.89% of MyFC members voted to
purchase a 75% share in the Ebbsfleet, making MyFC the first online
community to own and manage run a professional sports club.159
Using an Internet intermediary for the purpose of funding an
investment is quickly gaining traction, challenging traditional notions of
capital formation and investment. On April 5, 2012, President Obama
signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act into law.160
Title III of the Act provides a crowdfunding exemption to securities
registration requirements, setting a maximum of one million dollars in
crowdfunded securities that any issuer can offer within any
twelve-month period.161 For investors with less than $100,000 of annual
income or net worth, it sets the aggregate amount that can be sold by
any issuer to the greater of $2,000 or 5% of annual income or net
worth; for investors with incomes or net worth of $100,000 or greater,

155. Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/
kickstarter%20basics?ref=nav (last visited Oct. 7, 2012); Indiegogo FAQ, INDIEGOGO,
http://www.indiegogo.com/indiegogo-faq (last visited Oct. 7, 2012); Crowdfund with
Sponsume, SPONSUME, http://www.sponsume.com/getting-started (last visited Oct. 7,
2012); Learn More about The Point, THE POINT, http://www.thepoint.com/
doc/learn_more (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
156. See, e.g., Backer Questions, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/
help/faq/backer%20questions (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
157. See Simon Cowan, For The Love of Gold, Let’s Find a Better Way to
Fund Sport, INCISE (Aug. 21, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.incise.org.au/2012-08-21/
for-the-love-of-gold-lets-find-a-better-way-to-fund-sport/; History, MYFOOTBALLCLUB,
http://www.myfootballclub.co.uk/history (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
158. See History, supra note 157.
159. Fans’ Website Approves Fleet Deal, BBCSPORT (Jan. 23, 2008. 12:11),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/g/gravesend_and_northfleet/7190175.st
m.
160. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
161. § 302.
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the aggregate amount is set at 10% of annual income or net worth, not
to exceed $100,000.162 The Act is widely anticipated to open a new
mode of capital formation for small businesses and startups, which have
struggled to raise funds from traditional sources such as banks and
venture capitalists.163 The success of peer purchasing sites such as
Groupon and LivingSocial suggest that incorporating a threshold pledge
or conditional MBG component to these capital raising efforts could
prove instrumental in encouraging potential investors to contribute.
2. PAYMENTS LAW: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Another potential application of conditional MBGs lies in the
introduction of new technologies. Payments law, for instance, has been
plagued by obstacles to the adoption of new, more efficient payment
technologies. Despite their notorious costs, checks continue to be
widely used in the United States, with “[t]he number of checks paid in
2009 . . . estimated to have been 24.5 billion, with a value of $31.6
trillion.”164 Meanwhile, sophisticated chip-enabled stored-value cards
and electronic money have failed to take hold, and early developers of
these technologies—DigiCash, First Virtual, Mondex, Beenz.com, and
Flooz.com, among others—have failed miserably.165
One way of viewing the problem is as a coordination game among
payment service providers, merchants, and consumers. Payment service
providers may be unwilling to invest in developing new technologies
lest their initial outlay of time, money, and effort comes to naught.
Merchants may be unwilling to purchase expensive new equipment
without some kind of assurance that a critical mass of consumers and
other businesses will adopt the payment form. And consumers may be
reluctant to embrace a new payment form until enough other merchants
and consumers begin using it so that its benefits and risks become

Id.
See, e.g., Lee Barken, The Wisdom of the Crowd: Social Networking
Meets Capital Formation, XCONOMY (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.xconomy.com/
162.
163.

national/2011/11/08/the-wisdom-of-the-crowd-social-networking-meets-capitalformation/.
164. GEOFFREY R. GERDES ET AL., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS
STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2009, at 7 (2010),
available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/
2010_payments_study.pdf.
165. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 336 (5th ed. 2011); Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans:

Regulating the Competition between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment
Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 692–93 (1999).
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known and familiar. Though everyone would benefit from the
introduction of the new payment technology, fear traps them in the less
risky equilibrium of using existing, though less efficient, payment
mechanisms.
The coordinative potential of the conditional MBG should by now
be apparent. A conditional MBG could be offered by a payment service
provider to induce merchants to adopt a new payment technology.
Perhaps it could take the form of a guarantee that the merchant’s
commitment to purchase an innovative new smart card reader would be
enforced only if a certain number of other vendors agreed to purchase
the reader or a certain number of consumers applied for the new card.
Any number of variations is possible.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to demonstrate the coordinative
potential of risk-reducing mechanisms such as conditional MBGs. In
many situations where individuals have a shared interest in reaching (or
avoiding) certain outcomes, anonymity, information asymmetries, risk
aversion, and lack of trust form obstacles to coordination. Conventional
theory assumes that problems of coordination are solved by changing
expectations expressively. Little attention has been paid to the potential
value of changing expectations through the alteration of underlying
payoffs.
This Article has attempted to highlight conditional MBGs as an
alternative to focal points and sanctions. Because fear locks individuals
in suboptimal coordination points, mechanisms that directly target that
fear would seem appropriate. In diffuse, anonymous collective action
settings where losses are salient and easily quantifiable, conditional
MBGs, which alter underlying payoffs, may be particularly useful in
facilitating coordination in the Assurance Game. I have suggested two
characteristics that could optimize the effectiveness of the conditional
MBG: the excludability of the good and the credibility of commitment.
In many respects, this Article is highly preliminary; like any
theory, it requires empirical testing. My primary aim has been to
explore the immense potential of conditional MBGs in remedying
strategic coordination failures. This analysis easily could be
extrapolated out to other risk-reducing mechanisms in settings far
removed from the consumer context. Consider the mutiny, a classic
Assurance Game—an individual is only willing to participate if he can
be assured that enough others will participate as well. Altering
underlying payoffs can solve the coordination dilemma by destroying it.
Combined with the inherent coordinative capacity of the Internet, the
results could well be dramatic. One need only consider the role, still
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debated, of social networking sites in the so-called “Arab Spring” in
Egypt and Tunisia166 to grasp the potentially explosive power of this
combination. It is a story of the empowerment of the individual as
much as the power of the crowd. In closing, I leave the reader with that
indelible image of the aggressive mob of bargain-hungry tuángòu
shoppers in China. It takes no stretch of the imagination to envision
how mass coordination driven by the will to get a good bargain could
one day ripen into the will and courage to make far more significant
demands for political reform and individual liberties.

166. See Anupam Chander, Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1505, 1520–21 (2012); Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of
Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1379
(2012).

